The Futarchy
Machine
A PoW. Proof of work with the hash function removed and the commitment left intact: metered in capital held rather than joules dissipated, difficulty repriced by participation rather than by a target, and settled against revenue the market has already produced. What is left is a futarchy, where the vote is a machine and the ballot is nine positions you have to keep open.
What proof of work actually is
A hash function takes any input and returns a fixed length number. It is one directional. Given the output there is no method for recovering the input, and no method for steering the input toward an output you want. The only available technique is to try a value, look at the result, and try another.
Bitcoin uses this to run a lottery that cannot be rigged. A miner assembles a candidate block, appends an arbitrary number called a nonce, and hashes the whole thing. If the resulting number happens to fall below a target value, the block is valid and the network accepts it. If it does not, the miner increments the nonce and tries again.
There is no cleverness available. No shortcut exists, no partial credit accrues, and a machine that has failed ten trillion times is in exactly the same position as a machine that just switched on. The process is memoryless, which is the property that makes the whole thing work.
The target is adjusted every 2016 blocks so that somebody, somewhere, gets lucky roughly every ten minutes. As more machines join, the target tightens. The network does not get faster. It gets harder.
Inside the machine
A modern rig is a single purpose object. It computes one function, SHA-256, and it can do nothing else. It is not a computer that has been pointed at mining. It is a heater with an opinion about numbers.
Electricity inThe only real input. It is metered, it is paid for, and it does not come back.
Heat outAlmost all of that energy leaves the box as heat within seconds of entering it.
The guessingChips try nonces in parallel, trillions per second. Every wrong guess is discarded and never reused.
A solutionOne guess lands under the target and becomes a block. The rig has nothing else to show for the interval.
Watch what the box actually consumes and produces. Electricity goes in and is metered. Heat comes out, almost immediately, in nearly the same quantity. Somewhere in the middle, trillions of guesses per second are made and discarded. Over a ten minute interval, a rig will produce hundreds of trillions of failed hashes and, if it is fortunate, one number worth keeping.
Every one of those failures was paid for at retail electricity prices. None of them are recoverable, refundable, or reusable. That is not a flaw in the design. That is the design.
What the machine actually proves
Proof of work is not valuable because the hashes are useful. They are not useful. They are garbage numbers thrown away by the trillion.
It is valuable because a valid block is a receipt for expenditure that already happened. You cannot produce one cheaply, you cannot produce one retroactively, and you cannot convince anybody you produced one when you did not. Rewriting history means paying the entire bill again, in real energy, at current prices, faster than everybody else is paying it forward.
Strip away the cryptography and a very simple structure remains. There is a resource that is genuinely costly to commit. Committing it is publicly verifiable. Committing more of it than others, over the same interval, earns a claim. And the claim is worth less as more people commit alongside you.
Nothing in that structure requires the resource to be electricity.
The substitution
Ponzi Miners keeps the structure and replaces one variable. The costly, continuously recommitted, publicly verifiable thing is not electricity. It is capital held in the nine components.
This is not a metaphor stretched over a staking contract, and the difference is worth being precise about. There is no deposit, no lock, and no contract holding anything. Your tokens sit in your own wallet and you can sell them in the next block. What is committed is not custody. It is exposure.
A staking contract makes leaving expensive by refusing to let you leave. This makes leaving expensive by making it cost you the machine. Nothing is confiscated and nothing unbonds; the rig simply stops qualifying at the next cycle, because the next cycle asks the chain again and the parts are no longer there.
That is closer to a real miner than a lock is. A miner does not have their hardware seized for switching it off. They stop earning, immediately, and their hardware is still worth whatever the market says it is worth.
The rig
Hashrate is not granted for holding any one thing. It is assembled, from nine components, each of which is a separate coin with a separate market. A hashboard is worth many multiples of a ribbon cable for the same reason it is in the real bill of materials, and the machine will not run without either of them.
You own a component when your wallet holds one million of its tokens, and you own it for exactly as long as that stays true. Two million of a component a machine takes three of gives you two. Four million still gives you three, because a chain has three slots and the fourth board has nowhere to go.
When every required part is on the machine, the owner signs a message from the wallet that holds them and the build begins. The signature costs nothing and proves the rig belongs to that keypair rather than to a browser session.
More hashboards mean more TH/s and a larger claim on every cycle. They also mean a larger power draw and a worse efficiency figure, which is the trade a real miner makes and the reason nobody simply buys infinite hardware.
What it costs to keep running
There is no fuel meter here, and it would be dishonest to install one: there is nothing to burn. The cost of running is not a fee we charge. It is the fact that you are holding nine volatile assets, in size, and not something else.
That cost is real and it is continuous. It is paid in exposure to nine markets that can fall, in capital that is doing nothing else, and in the spread you cross on the way in and again on the way out. Nobody invoices you for it. You simply have it.
And it has the property that matters: it cannot be paid once. A miner who stops paying for electricity stops mining that hour. A wallet that stops holding its hashboards stops mining that cycle. Neither keeps a claim on the strength of what they committed yesterday.
The circuit
Two flows run in opposite directions and meet at settlement. Capital enters the nine coins as demand for parts. Fees leave those same coins as creator revenue and come back as distributions. The two are the same market seen from opposite ends, which is the entire point.
Every trade of every component coin pays its creator a share, collected in ETH by the pons fee escrow. All nine coins name the same recipient, so nine fee streams pool into one balance and a single claim collects the lot.
That field is written into each coin at creation and cannot be reassigned afterwards, by us or by anyone, so the stream has exactly one destination for as long as the coins trade. The pot swaps what it claimed into the payout asset and sends it out. Nothing is held back on the way past.
Cycles
Every ten minutes a cycle closes. The pot is not a figure anybody chose. It is exactly what the nine coins earned in fees since the previous cycle, swapped into the payout asset and settled against whoever was actually running at that moment.
The consequence is worth stating plainly. A quiet market settles an empty cycle. There is no emission to fall back on and no treasury topping up a disappointing hour, so the yield is a measurement rather than a promise. Fees are real, or they are zero.
Boundaries are wall-clock aligned rather than counted from whenever the keeper last woke up, so every observer agrees where a cycle starts, and a keeper that was offline cannot invent cycles to make the ledger look busier than the market was.
Difficulty
The pot is split by hashrate. If you are a tenth of the network you take a tenth of it, and if the network doubles while you stand still you take half as much.
That is a genuine difficulty curve, not a decorative one. Not difficulty in the cryptographic sense, but difficulty in capturing a meaningful percentage of output. Early, a modest rig is a large fraction of the field. As machines arrive, holding that same fraction means buying more parts, in a market that has just been bid up by everybody else doing the same thing. The system becomes harder to mine as a direct result of people mining it, which is exactly what Bitcoin's target adjustment produces.
The split runs against the whole network including a baseline nobody owns, so a single machine arriving first does not take everything. What the baseline would have earned is simply not paid, and stays in the pot for the next cycle.
The reflexive part
Every part bought is buying pressure on a coin whose fees fund the pot. There is no buyback wallet and no discretionary schedule; the bid happens because somebody wanted to mine.
Notice the direction that pushes. The people bidding up the components are precisely the people competing for the fee stream those same components produce, so the cost of entry rises for everyone as the field fills, and the fees rise with it. The machine is priced in the thing the machine earns from.
It runs backwards just as readily. A field that empties out is nine coins being sold at once, which is the same event as the pot getting smaller. Nothing here is engineered to only go one way, and any description of it that only goes one way is a description of something else.
Futarchy, without the vote
Futarchy is a governance idea with a blunt slogan attached: vote on values, bet on beliefs. Decide what you want to maximise by ordinary means, then let a market rather than an assembly decide which action gets you there, because a market makes people pay for being wrong and a show of hands does not.
The objection to it has always been practical. Somebody has to define the measure, run the market, and rule on the outcome, and each of those is a place for judgement to re-enter through the back door.
Ponzi Miners sidesteps all three, because the measure is not a proposition anybody wrote down. It is fee revenue, and it settles itself.
Buying hashrate is a bet with real stakes. You take on nine positions now, and keep them, against the belief that the fees produced while your machine runs will exceed what those positions cost you to carry. Nobody is asked whether they think activity will hold up. They are asked to stand behind the answer with capital, for as long as the answer is supposed to be true.
Difficulty is the price of that bet. When more people believe, more capital is bid into the same nine coins, and every participant's slice of the same fee stream gets smaller. Optimism is not free here. It is quoted, continuously, in TH/s.
The market clears every ten minutes, and it clears against something that already happened rather than against a forecast. A cycle does not pay out because sentiment was good. It pays out exactly the fees the nine coins earned, split by who was actually running. Belief that was wrong is simply a position that is down.
That is the whole apparatus of futarchy with the committee removed: participants express beliefs by putting capital irreversibly at risk, the aggregate is legible as a single public number, and settlement is an observation rather than a judgement.
The thesis
Bitcoin is usually described as a monetary invention. It is more precisely a discovery about allocation, and the discovery is small enough to write down in a single line.
Share of an interval equals your committed resource over everyone's.
Each participant receives the fraction of an interval's output that matches the fraction of the costly resource they committed to it. That expression contains no electricity, no SHA-256, no hardware, and no reference to money. It is the entire engine.
What Bitcoin did was choose the variables. The resource is energy. Verification is a hash below a target. The interval is ten minutes. The output is issuance plus fees. Those choices are extraordinary, and they are still only choices. They are not the mechanism.
Notice that the properties everybody attributes to mining are consequences of the expression rather than of the variables:
- As more resource is committed, each unit earns less. That is difficulty.
- The resource must be recommitted continuously or the share decays to zero. There is no rent.
- Settlement is probabilistic per interval rather than smooth. That is variance.
- The resource cannot be produced after the interval closes. There are no retroactive claims.
None of those require a hash.
Assemble your rig
Nine components, each one a token. Hold a million of one and you own it. Own everything a machine needs, sign once, and every ten minutes the fees those components earned are split across the field by hashrate.
Assemble your rig, hold your components, and the machine pays you in $MSTR, every ten minutes, for as long as it runs.
